

1 **Differences in viral disinfection mechanisms as revealed by quantitative transfection of Echovirus**
2 **11 genomes**

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12

13 **Abstract**

14 Virus inactivation mechanisms can be elucidated by methods which measure the loss of specific virus
15 functionality (e.g., host attachment, genome internalization, genome replication). Genome functionality is
16 frequently assessed by PCR-based methods, which are indirect and potentially inaccurate; genome
17 damage that affects detection by high-fidelity PCR enzymes may not adversely affect the ability of actual
18 cellular enzymes to produce functional virus. Therefore, we here develop a transfection-based assay to
19 quantitatively determine viral genome functionality by inserting viral RNA into host cells directly to
20 measure their ability to produce new functional viruses from damaged viral genomes. Echovirus 11 was
21 treated with ozone, free chlorine (FC), UV₂₅₄ or heat and reductions in genome functionality and
22 infectivity were compared. Ozone reduced genome functionality proportionally to infectivity, indicating
23 that genome damage is the main mechanism of virus inactivation. In contrast, FC caused little or no loss
24 of genome functionality compared to infectivity, indicating a larger role for protein damage. For UV₂₅₄,
25 genome functionality loss accounted for approximately 60% of virus inactivation, with the remainder
26 presumably due to protein damage. Heat treatment resulted in no reduction in genome functionality, in
27 agreement with the understanding that heat inactivation results from capsid damage. Our results indicate
28 that there is a fundamental difference between genome integrity reductions measured by PCR enzymes in
29 previous studies and actual genome functionality (whether the genome can produce virus) post
30 disinfection. Compared to PCR, quantitative transfection assays provide a more realistic picture of actual
31 viral genome functionality and overall inactivation mechanisms during disinfection.

32

33 **Importance**

34 This study provides a new tool for assessing virus inactivation mechanisms by directly measuring a viral
35 genome's ability to produce new viruses after disinfection. In addition, we identify a potential pitfall of
36 PCR for determining virus genome damage, which does not reflect whether a genome is truly functional.
37 The results presented here using quantitative transfection corroborate previously suggested virus
38 inactivation mechanisms for some virus inactivation methods (heat) while bringing additional insights for

39 others (ozone, FC and UV₂₅₄). The developed transfection method provides a more mechanistic approach
40 for the assessment of actual virus inactivation by common water disinfectants.

41

42 **Keywords**

43 transfection, disinfection, ozone, free chlorine, UV₂₅₄, heat inactivation, echovirus 11, genome integrity,

44 genome functionality, Enterovirus

45 **1. Introduction**

46

47 Waterborne infectious viruses (e.g., norovirus, hepatitis A virus, rotavirus, etc.) have a great impact
48 on human health, causing a range of diseases from acute self-limiting diarrheal/vomiting episodes to
49 chronic hepatic infections with long lasting impacts on human health (1). Although traditional wastewater
50 and drinking water treatment schemes greatly reduce the prevalence of these viruses, some viruses have
51 been found to withstand treatment, and therefore circulate in otherwise healthy populations on a regular
52 basis (2, 3). Compared to other pathogens, viruses are more difficult to remove by physical water
53 treatment methods (e.g., sedimentation or filtration) due to their small size, wherefore, inclusion of a
54 disinfection step is of key importance to ensure public health (4).

55 Different disinfection methods have varying effects on enteric viruses; the virus can be inactivated by
56 disrupting one or a combination of essential structures, including the virus genome (coding for the
57 production of progeny viruses), and the virus protein capsid that protects the genome and facilitates
58 attachment and entry into host cells. Heat and certain chemical disinfectants (ClO_2) tend to disrupt the
59 viral capsid (5, 6), while UV_{254} disinfection tends to act on the viral genome by causing the formation of
60 pyrimidine dimers (7, 8), but can also form oxidants which can be responsible for disinfection (9, 10).
61 Chemical disinfectants such as free chlorine (FC) and ozone act on a broad range of targets in viruses
62 including the viral capsid (6, 10, 11), specific viral attachment epitopes (5), and viral RNA/DNA (6, 10,
63 12).

64 Several studies have attempted to discern the mechanism of viral inactivation for these and other
65 disinfectants, focusing on capsid integrity/genome protection (13, 14), protein damage (6, 15–17),
66 genome integrity (6, 18), virus attachment to host cells (5, 10, 13, 19) or cell entry (10, 19). Many of these
67 studies offer differing mechanisms for a given disinfection method, either contradicting each other or
68 placing differing weights on the importance of different mechanisms and their overall contribution to

69 virus infection loss. Some of these contradictions may depend specifically on the virus targeted. For
70 example, Roy et al. (12) found that ozone treatment of poliovirus type 1, while causing damage to viral
71 proteins, did not lead to disintegration of the viral capsid and led to minimal reductions in virus
72 attachment to host cells. The main inactivation mechanism was instead found to be related to genome
73 damage. In contrast, Kim et al. (20) reported extensive ozone damage to the capsid of bacteriophage f2;
74 they surmised that the breakup of capsid proteins led to a loss of binding ability and subsequent genome
75 delivery for this virus, while genome damage was viewed as a minor secondary inactivation mechanism.
76 In addition, differences in inactivation mechanisms may also result from the applied disinfectant doses.
77 For example, in the case of FC, doses lower than 0.8 mg/L were found to inactivate poliovirus type 1
78 while the capsid remained largely intact, whereas for doses higher than this the capsid was found to
79 disintegrate (11). A better understanding of inactivation mechanisms can help to rationalize differences in
80 reported inactivation rate constants for different enteric viruses during disinfection processes.

81 Viruses contain multiple copies of the same protein, but only one copy of genomic DNA/RNA.
82 Damage to the viral genome is therefore a more unique indicator of potential functionality loss compared
83 to protein damage, which may be compensated by intact protein copies in the same capsid. Quantifying
84 the functionality of a viral genome, however, remains challenging. The most common method for probing
85 the presence and integrity of genetic material in a sample is polymerase chain reaction (PCR). However,
86 PCR uses highly optimized enzymes, which may not reflect whether or not viral or cellular polymerases
87 used during virus replication could successfully replicate viruses from a damaged genome. For this reason,
88 PCR-based methods will not provide an exact picture of actual genome functionality. A more direct
89 method to test viral genome functionality is transfection, which offers the possibility for directly
90 determining the potential of a viral genome to produce progeny viruses (21, 22). Transfection is the
91 process by which a piece of RNA/DNA is inserted directly into a host cell for transcription (for DNA),
92 translation and replication. In the case of viruses, transfection of a viral genome bypasses attachment,
93 entry and unpacking mechanisms that the virus normally uses to insert its genome into a cell for

94 replication. Transfection lends itself particularly well to the study of enteric viruses that have a defined
95 culture system, because many such enteric viruses are (+) sense ssRNA viruses (poliovirus,
96 coxsackievirus, echovirus, etc.). The hallmark of (+) sense ssRNA genomes is that they can produce
97 infectious virus by themselves; in other words, the initiation of viral protein production does not require
98 the initial presence of a packaged enzyme, such as an RNA-dependent RNA-polymerase (RdRp), and all
99 necessary proteins for viral replication can be produced by cellular ribosomes from the initial viral
100 genome (23).

101 Viral genome transfection has previously been applied to assess the mode of action of different
102 inactivation treatments. However, these studies were either not quantitative (22) or the transfection assay
103 exhibited a very small dynamic range (21). In this study, we propose a most probable number (MPN) –
104 based transfection method for quantifying the amount of infectious viral RNA in a sample. Using
105 Echovirus 11 (E11) as a model, we analyzed the reduction of functional viral RNA as MPN transfectable
106 genome units (TGUs)/mL after various disinfection methods (ozone, free chlorine, UV₂₅₄, and heat) and
107 compared these with reductions of infectious E11 observed by traditional cell culture techniques.
108 Ultimately, our goal was to directly determine the contribution of the loss of genome functionality of E11
109 to the overall inactivation by each disinfectant.

110

111 **2. Results**

112 *2.1. MPN Transfection Method Validation*

113 To validate the developed transfection assay, we assessed the transfection method with respect to
114 detection limit, proportionality with the infectivity assay, and repeatability. Serially diluted samples of
115 untreated E11 were quantified to determine both the concentration of infectious virus (IV) and of TGUs in
116 each sample (Figure 1). The developed transfection assay was found to be able to detect TGUs in samples
117 with $\geq 4.9 \times 10^5$ IV/mL. However, no TGUs were detected in a sample containing 7.8×10^4 IV/mL (“×”

118 symbol in Figure 1). This suggests a lower concentration limit for successful transfection at
119 approximately 5×10^5 IV/mL.

120 The \log_{10} TGU/mL measured for a given sample was found to increase linearly with the \log_{10} IV/mL,
121 with a slope that was not statistically different from 1 (0.9 ± 0.2 , slope \pm 95% CI). Therefore, we
122 considered changes in the transfectable genome concentration to be directly proportional to changes in the
123 infectious virus concentrations. However, the measured concentration of TGUs was found to be lower
124 than the concentration of infectious virus; TGUs/mL were typically 3 \log_{10} less than corresponding IV/mL,
125 with measured TGUs/mL ranging from 1.3×10^2 to 2.3×10^5 TGU/mL, and infectious virus
126 concentrations ranging from 4.9×10^5 to 3.3×10^8 IV/mL. The average ratio of transfectable genome :
127 infectious viruses (TGU/IV) across all samples was $7.8 \times 10^{-4} \pm 8.0 \times 10^{-4}$.

128 For three samples of E11 with differing concentrations of infectious virus, the repeatability of the
129 transfection assay was confirmed by measuring the concentration of TGUs 5 times using the developed
130 MPN transfection assay (Figure 1B). \log_{10} E11 concentrations of 5.7, 6.7, and 8.5 IV/mL yielded \log_{10}
131 average (\pm 95% CI) TGUs/mL of 2.32 ± 0.29 , 3.90 ± 0.21 , and 4.96 ± 0.25 , respectively.

132 *Confirmation of infectious E11 production during transfection*

133 From a total of 8 transfection experiments, 1,684 transfected wells were selected for confirmation by re-
134 inoculating the liquid contained in the well onto fresh BGMK cells (Table 1). Of these wells, 838
135 exhibited a cytopathic effect (CPE), whereas 846 wells were CPE negative. Of the transfection CPE
136 positive wells, 713/838 (85%) were found to cause CPE on new BGMK cells, indicating the presence of
137 an infectious agent in these wells and a false-positive percentage of 15%. Of the CPE negative wells,
138 20/846 (2%) were found to cause CPE in new wells. Sensitivity ($\frac{\text{True Positives}}{\text{True Positives} + \text{False Negatives}}$) was
139 calculated to be 97% while specificity ($\frac{\text{True Negatives}}{\text{True Negatives} + \text{False Positives}}$) was 87%. The majority of the false
140 positive wells were found to stem from wells containing high concentrations of carrier RNA (cRNA,
141 small pieces of RNA with random sequences used to enhance RNA extraction efficiency). Specifically, it

142 was determined that transfected wells containing $>0.5 \mu\text{L}$ equivalent volumes of diluted RNA extract
143 (equivalent to $\sim 3.47 \times 10^{-2} \mu\text{g}$ cRNA) could potentially display CPE unrelated to viral RNA transfection
144 (see Supplementary Information, Table S1). Thus, a second sensitivity/specificity analysis was conducted
145 excluding all cRNA affected wells (Table 1). This analysis included 1,268 transfected wells, of which 466
146 were CPE positive and 802 were CPE negative. Exclusion of the cRNA affected wells decreased the
147 number of false positives from 125 (15%) to 19 (4%), resulting in an increased CPE specificity of 98%.
148 For all further analysis, we therefore excluded all cRNA affected wells from MPN calculations. This had
149 the effect of decreasing the window of observable MPN values, however the removal of cRNA from the
150 extraction step was found to cause even greater decreases in this detection window (see Supplementary
151 Information, Table S2). Removal of the wells from analysis was thus deemed to be preferable and
152 ultimately necessary given the high false positive rates observed when including the wells in analysis.

153 From the CPE-positive transfection wells, 8 wells were selected for confirmation by reverse-
154 transcription quantitative PCR (RT-qPCR) with primers specific to E11. All of these samples (100%)
155 were found to be positive for E11; In addition, qPCR cycle numbers were deemed to be lower (higher in
156 RNA concentration) than that of transfected wells containing initially transfected E11 RNA but lacking
157 CPE (i.e., wells that did not produce progeny virus).

158 2.2. *Comparison of infectious virus and functional genome loss after disinfection*

159 To determine the contribution of genome functionality loss to inactivation, we compared reductions of
160 infectious E11 and the corresponding loss in TGUs (Figure 2).

161 *Ozone*

162 E11 was subjected to ozone doses ranging from 2.7-9.8 mg O_3/L . This resulted in \log_{10} reductions of IV
163 ranging from -0.31 – 1.95 (Figure 2a). Corresponding reductions in functional genome (determined as
164 TGUs) were also observed, ranging from 0.03 – 2.76- \log_{10} . Reductions of TGUs were positively
165 correlated with reductions in IV, with a linear regression resulting in a slope of 0.91 ± 0.36 .

166 *Free Chlorine*

167 Infectious E11 exposed to FC doses of 2, 2.5 and 3 mg/L (as HOCl) for various time intervals was
168 reduced between 1.48 – 4.53- \log_{10} (Figure 2b). No reduction in functional genome was observed at FC
169 concentrations of 2 mg/L for any of the exposure times tested (12 to 60 seconds), even though IV
170 concentrations decreased by 1.48 – 2.95- \log_{10} . For FC concentrations of 2.5 and 3 mg/L, reductions in
171 TGUs ranged from 0.5 – 1.2- \log_{10} . Reductions of TGUs were positively correlated with reductions in
172 infectious virus, with a linear regression resulting in a slope of 0.38 ± 0.31 .

173 *UV₂₅₄*

174 Reductions of infectious E11 exposed to monochromatic UV₂₅₄ light for various fluences (35 – 175.2
175 J/m²) ranged from 0.09 – 3.00- \log_{10} (Figure 2c). A corresponding loss of genome functionality was also
176 observed, ranging from -0.40 – 2.32- \log_{10} . Loss of genome functionality was positively correlated with a
177 loss of infectious virus, with a linear regression resulting in a slope of 0.36 ± 0.30 .

178 *Heat*

179 E11 was exposed to a temperature of 55°C for various exposure times, resulting in reductions of
180 infectious virus ranging from 2.58 – 5.86- \log_{10} (Figure 2d). The corresponding reductions in functional
181 genome ranged from -0.75 – 0.77- \log_{10} . Increased reductions of infectious virus did not correlate with
182 reductions of TGUs, which were limited when observed. A linear regression resulted in a slope of
183 approximately zero (-0.04 ± 0.26).

184 **3. Discussion**

185 **3.1. Development and Scope of MPN Transfection Assay**

186 PCR-based methods have the benefit of being rapid with high specificity, and have proven indispensable
187 for detecting and determining the prevalence of viruses in various water environments as well as for
188 measuring physical removal in various treatment schemes. In recent decades, PCR-based methods have

189 also been applied for measuring genome integrity following disinfection(24). While several of these
190 studies have drawn correlations between, for example, reductions of infectious virus and qPCR detection
191 of the whole genome(18) or genome segments(25–27), this success depends on several factors. First,
192 different disinfectants vary in the type and severity of damage caused to the genome (e.g., RNA structural
193 modification, phosphate backbone scission, etc.), and thus a reduction of PCR amplification may or may
194 not correlate with infectious virus reduction. Second, and perhaps most importantly, these PCR methods
195 only measure the ability of the PCR enzymes used in the assay to copy a segment of the viral genome.
196 These PCR enzymes are chosen by manufacturers to be less error prone in order to improve the accuracy
197 of PCR, and thus they may be more sensitive to certain types of genome damage than an actual cellular
198 enzyme would be. These points call into question the validity of using PCR as a tool for determining viral
199 genome functionality.

200 A more conclusive approach consists of a direct measurement of the ability of a host cell to
201 replicate a genome after disinfection. This can be accomplished by utilizing transfection methods, where a
202 virus genome can be inserted directly into host cells to observe their ability to create viral progeny after
203 disinfection. The number of studies directly targeting genome functionality through transfection has been
204 limited to date (21, 22). While these studies hinted at the potential of transfection methods, they were
205 either applied as a minor part of the study with little quantitative data or were limited to a narrow
206 measurable range of the transfection assay; both of these factors inherently affect mechanistic inferences
207 drawn from these studies. We therefore set out to develop a new transfection protocol that could build on
208 these previous studies. The transfection protocol developed herein has two main benefits over previously
209 published approaches. First, our assay was designed to be a robust quantitative assay, i.e., it yields TGU
210 concentrations estimated based on a MPN method, with good repeatability and proportionality to the
211 corresponding concentration of infectious viruses (Figure 1). Second, this assay has an improved
212 transfection performance compared to previously published transfection protocols, which reported ratios
213 of transfectable genome : infectious viruses of 10^{-5} - 10^{-6} (21). In the current study a TGU/IV ratio of

214 7.8×10^{-4} was achieved (Figure 1); while still low, this represents an improvement allowing us to measure
215 transfection over a greater extent of inactivation for a given disinfectant. The low TGU/IV ratio could not
216 be attributed to the virus concentration procedure, as only minimal losses of intact virus and viral RNA
217 were observed from this step (See supplemental information, Fig S1). Instead, the low ratio likely stems
218 from the transfection procedure. Transfection efficiency can be affected by the cell type used for
219 transfection, the age of the cells, the type and concentration of transfection agent used and their ratios to
220 the amount of RNA , as well as other factors (28).

221 Despite this improvement, the low TGU/IV ratio attained with our protocol poses some challenges. A
222 minimum concentration of 5×10^5 IV/mL was necessary to detect TGUs in a given sample. This
223 effectively resulted in a limited window of observable TGU reductions from approximately $2 - 3 - \log_{10}$,
224 with lower detection limits being defined by the TGU/IV ratio and upper limits being defined by both the
225 starting concentration of the virus (typically $10^6 - 10^8$ IV/mL) in inactivation experiments and the ability
226 to concentrate the virus after inactivation experiments by centrifugal filtration (typical concentration
227 factor: $27 - 414 \times$). This window became more limiting with disinfection methods that targeted the viral
228 genome more (ozone and UV_{254}) rather than those with limited effect on the genome (heat). Thus, higher
229 levels of virus inactivation could be observed in heat inactivation experiments because there was nearly
230 no change in the TGUs between treated and untreated samples. In addition, the possibility of false-
231 positive transfection CPE caused by cRNA in less diluted RNA samples was found to further reduce the
232 window of measurable TGUs.

233 *Loss of genome functionality with different inactivation methods*

234 *Ozone*

235 A significant loss of infectivity was observed for E11 after ozone treatment in absence of hydroxyl radical
236 (quenching with *t*-butanol). This loss of infectious virus was matched nearly 1:1 with observed losses in
237 genome functionality as determined by the MPN transfection assay (Figure 2a). From this result, it is

238 evident that the loss of genome function accounts for the majority of the loss of viral infectivity, although
239 it is likely that ozone reacts with the viral capsid as well. Ozone is known to react with both nucleoside
240 monomers and specific amino acids (cysteine, histidine, methionine, tryptophan, and tyrosine)(29),
241 wherefore, it is expected that ozone should be able to cause significant damage to the macromolecules
242 composed of these moieties, proteins and nucleic acids. However, in order for such damage to lead to
243 virus inactivation it needs to 1) be significant enough at a given target point as to cause a change in
244 protein/genome folding and function and 2) occur with sufficient frequency as to damage a significant
245 number of protein copies as to cause irreversible damage to some aspect of virus functionality. Partial
246 oxidation may not necessarily lead to inactivation, in particular if the capsid remains intact and the
247 protein-mediated viral functions (cell attachment and genome internalization) are preserved.

248 Our findings are consistent with those by Roy et al. (12), who utilized velocity sedimentation
249 analysis to demonstrate that inactivation of poliovirus (an enterovirus closely related to E11) by low
250 concentrations of ozone (~0.3 mg/L) was predominately due to genome damage as opposed to capsid
251 damage. The poliovirus capsid was found to remain intact after exposure to ozone. If we assume the same
252 behavior for E11 (genome functionality loss while the capsid remains intact), this implies that ozone is
253 able to diffuse through the capsid without completely reacting with capsid proteins. This is likely due to
254 low reactivity of ozone with the amides in the peptide backbone and/or from lack of solvent accessibility
255 for specific reaction sites on the proteins (activated aromatic or organosulfur side chains). However, it is
256 possible that different viruses with changing amino acid sequences of capsid proteins and different
257 resulting tertiary structure folding can change solvent exposed moieties. For example, a key amino acid
258 that is susceptible to ozone damage may result in a drastic change in capsid integrity, resulting in much
259 higher inactivation compared to genome functionality loss; this warrants further study for different viral
260 species and even closely related virus strains.

261 Overall, our findings thus imply 1) that ozone reacts strongly with E11 genomes and 2) that such
262 reactions are damaging enough as to prevent the cellular machinery from properly reading the viral RNA
263 to produce virus progeny.

264 *Free chlorine*

265 Similar to ozone, FC also reacts rapidly with the building blocks of both RNA and proteins (30)
266 Yet, compared to ozone, inactivation by FC was found to have less impact on genome functionality,
267 indicating a higher contribution of capsid damage to inactivation for FC (Figure 2b). Although E11
268 treated with 2 mg/L were reduced by up to 2.95- \log_{10} IV/mL, no reduction in TGU_s was observed. At
269 higher doses of 2.5 and 3 mg/L FC resulted in maximum reductions of 4.53- \log_{10} IV/mL, with only minor
270 genome functionality losses (maximum of 1.2- \log_{10} TGU_s/mL).

271 A comparison of genome functionality measured by transfection and genome integrity as
272 measured by qPCR offers a striking contrast in results. In a previous study by our group (5), we assessed
273 E11 genome integrity upon exposure to FC doses between 1 and 2 mg/L at pH 7.5 using qPCR; for a ~ 5-
274 \log_{10} reduction of infectious virus, a ~30- \log_{10} reduction was observed for the probability of observing an
275 entire intact genome by qPCR. This indicates that, even at low doses of FC, a large proportion of the viral
276 genome is damaged to the point where it is no longer amplifiable by qPCR. However, as shown by the
277 transfection results of the current study, the viral genome remains functional despite the significant
278 damage incurred during chlorination. This highlights the fact that these two methods are measuring
279 fundamentally different aspects of damage induced to the viral genome during chlorination.

280 The lack of damage to genome functionality compared to overall inactivation observed in our
281 experiment can be in part explained by the chlorine doses used for the experiments combined with the
282 speciation of FC at the tested pH (7.5). The species distribution of hypochlorite ($pK_a = 7.5$ at 25°C) is
283 approximately 1:1 for HOCl and OCl⁻ at the experimental pH (7.5) (31). Thus both species were present
284 at effective initial concentrations of 1, 1.25 and 1.5 mg/L for our experiments. Of the two chlorine species,

285 HOCl is more reactive (31); it is known to react with high second order rate constants with the neutral
286 amines of the *N*-terminus of proteins as well as free neutral amines, with activated aromatic and
287 organosulfur side chains of the amino acids tryptophan, tyrosine, histidine, lysine, methionine, and
288 cysteine (31), and with those same moieties in nucleotides. We thus expect HOCl to react with both
289 capsid and genome components of the virus. OCl⁻ has been shown to react with amides in protein
290 backbones causing chlorination of the peptide amide which eventually leads to hydrolysis of peptide
291 bonds (32); this could lead to additional capsid damage and possible virus inactivation. However, unlike
292 HOCl, OCl⁻ is not expected to cause significant damage to the viral genome. In a solution consisting of
293 1:1 HOCl and OCl⁻, there are thus twice as many protein-reactive species as genome-reactive ones. This
294 would explain why we detect higher inactivation rates by cell culture than by transfection assay at all
295 tested chlorine concentrations.

296 Taking both FC species into account, we hypothesize differing inactivation mechanisms based on
297 the FC concentration and the types of FC species present. At lower FC concentrations (reductions
298 observed by cell culture but not in terms of functional genome), inactivation of the virus likely results
299 from the contributions of both HOCl and OCl⁻ causing damage to the capsid proteins. HOCl is expected
300 to be the primary cause of damage to the genome, however at these low concentrations it is likely
301 consumed by the viral capsid, further reducing the effective concentration present around the viral
302 genome and thus resulting in little to no meaningful genome damage (which is not manifested in
303 functionality loss). Capsid damage at these concentrations may not be sufficient to disassemble the capsid
304 as previously demonstrated by Alvarez & O'Brien (11), who found that the mechanism of inactivation for
305 poliovirus type 1 at low concentrations of FC can change based on the applied dose. Specifically, at
306 concentrations below 0.8 mg/L they found that, while viral inactivation does occur, the capsid largely
307 remains intact. An intact capsid can thus still provide a degree of protection to the enclosed genome.
308 Despite having a functional genome, inactivation still occurs as a result of FC damage to capsid
309 components necessary for virus attachment, entry or uncoating.

310 At higher doses of FC, we observed more genome damage presumably due to higher exposures to
311 HOCl which thus would be able to penetrate deeper into the capsid or damage the capsid integrity first
312 and ultimately lead to higher local concentrations around the viral RNA. In addition, higher
313 concentrations of FC species are necessary to form unstable dichlorinated nitrogenous products that will
314 ultimately decay to secondary products and will not be reduced reversibly by the thiosulfate applied as a
315 neutralizing agent in our experiment. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of Nuanualsuwan and
316 Cliver (21), who used higher FC doses (4.8 mg/L) and found a near equivalent loss of RNA functionality
317 compared to the infectivity of poliovirus type 1. In addition, Alvarez & O'Brien (11) found that upon
318 increasing FC dosage, the extent of capsid damage also increased. This would explain why the
319 contribution of RNA functionality loss to inactivation increases with increasing FC doses, since the E11
320 capsid loses integrity at higher FC exposures and thus is no longer able to protect the contained viral
321 genome from bulk FC. Thus, it is apparent that experimental conditions (chlorine dose, pH) can have a
322 great impact on FC inactivation mechanisms especially as they relate to relative amounts of capsid vs
323 genome damage.

324 *UV*

325 Reductions of genome functionality exhibited a large amount of scatter for reasons that are not
326 understood. Nevertheless, a weak correlation ($R=0.47$) was found between \log_{10} TGU/mL and \log_{10}
327 IV/mL (Figure 2c) with the concentration of TGUs decreasing approximately 60% more slowly than that
328 of IV. This suggests that a portion of the E11 inactivation observed is due to protein capsid damage. This
329 result may appear surprising as UV_{254} is known to cause extensive damage to nucleic acids (33), and, in
330 contrast to chemical oxidants, its access to the genome is not hindered by diffusion through the viral
331 capsid. However, UV_{254} has also been reported to cause damage to viral proteins (15, 17, 34), and our
332 results indicate that this protein damage contributes significantly to inactivation.

333 Similar data was reported by Nuanualsuwan & Cliver (21) for poliovirus 1, which exhibited an
334 approximately 60% slower decay rate for the concentration of transfectable genomes compared to the

335 infectious virus. However, because these authors based their conclusion on a limited set of data points, the
336 reported decay rates were interpreted as being statistically equivalent, thus they suggested a more
337 important contribution of genome damage to inactivation.

338 In comparison, qPCR in the literature reports a reduction of genome integrity by UV₂₅₄ that is
339 approximately equivalent to the loss of virus infectivity (5, 18, 27), implying a minimal contribution of
340 protein damage to overall virus inactivation. While this is ideal for studies wishing to use qPCR tools as a
341 rapid alternative to cell culture for estimating loss of infectivity, from a mechanistic standpoint this data
342 diminishes the importance of potential protein damage, which based on the current study indicate may
343 play a larger role than previously concluded. This again reinforces the findings, that measuring a loss in
344 genome integrity by qPCR does not necessarily indicate a corresponding loss in genome functionality.

345 *Heat*

346 Heat was not found to result in a loss of genome functionality in this study. Although a high degree of
347 infectivity loss was observed (5.86-log_{10}), TGU loss was low or non-existent in all samples, indicating
348 that the viral genome was still capable of producing viral progeny similar to untreated samples. This is
349 consistent with the current understanding that heat inactivation of viruses occurs primarily as a result of
350 capsid protein denaturation rather than a loss in genome functionality (10). Nuanualsuwan and Cliver (21)
351 also observed a similar lack of genome functionality loss for poliovirus type 1 inactivated at 72°C.

352 Notably, qPCR based methods provide some conflicting conclusions between studies as far as genome
353 integrity loss from heat treatment. Zhong et al (5) demonstrated that E11 inactivated by heat resulted in no
354 loss of genome detection by qPCR even though a 5-log_{10} reduction in infectious virus was observed,
355 which coincides with the findings of the current study. In contrast, in a pair of studies by Hewitt and
356 Greening, small but significant reductions of detectable genome were observed after heating for human
357 norovirus GI and GII, murine norovirus (MNV) and hepatitis A virus (HAV) in water and milk at 63 and
358 72 °C (35) and also in shellfish for MNV and HAV after boiling and/or steaming (36). It is worth noting

359 that these studies involved qPCR detection of virus from complex matrices with high organic load, thus
360 perceived reductions could occur as a result of qPCR inhibition. Regardless, in all of these studies,
361 reductions of genome copies were typically $<1\text{-log}_{10}$ and were always lower than corresponding infectious
362 reductions determined by cell culture. While these results indicate that heat could potentially cause a
363 degree of damage to viral genomes, it appears that cellular enzymes are unphased by this type of genome
364 integrity loss, demonstrated by minimal reductions in genome functionality in the current study. Thus, it
365 is likely that the dominant inactivation mechanism is capsid protein mediated.

366 *The potential for intracellular recombination due to transfection*

367 It should be noted that with all of the above inactivation methods there is the possibility of the
368 recovery of inactivated viruses by recombination (also known as multiplicity reactivation) (37), whereby
369 multiple damaged genomes co-infecting the same cell can combine to create a functioning virus. The
370 transfection reagent used in this study (Lipofectamine MessengerMax) utilizes a cationic liposome
371 formulation which forms liposome complexes with negatively charged strands of nucleic acid material
372 (DNA/RNA). This allows genetic material that would ordinarily be electrostatically repelled by the cell
373 membrane to gain entry into a host cell. Depending on the RNA to lipofectamine ratio, some
374 liposome/genome complexes may contain more than one copy of viral genome. In addition, it may be
375 possible that multiple liposome/genome complexes can enter into the same cell. If multiple RNA
376 genomes are transfected into the same cell, the damaged genomes could recombine and recover
377 functionality, and hence inaccurately appear as a TGU. As such, the concentration of TGUs would be
378 overestimated. Recombination may thus offer an additional explanation to protein damage for cases
379 where the reduction of TGUs compared to IV was lower than expected (UV₂₅₄ and FC). However,
380 genome functionality and infectivity were directly proportional in the case of inactivation by ozone. This
381 indicates that in our experimental setup, recombination either did not occur, or its effect was sufficiently
382 small to not significantly influence the concentration of TGU. We are thus confident that the reported IV
383 vs TGU trends (Figure 2) accurately reflect the effect of disinfectants on genome functionality.

384 *Conclusions*

385 In this study we have demonstrated that transfection can be used to directly and quantitatively determine
386 genome functionality loss due to disinfection for a (+) sense ssRNA virus (E11). Although the utility of
387 this method for other virus genome types is unknown (dsDNA) or unlikely (in the case of (-) sense
388 ssRNA viruses), the method should be applicable to a large number of culturable health-related enteric
389 viruses ((+) sense ssRNA viruses), and represents a valuable addition to the environmental/disinfection
390 virology toolbox. Specifically, the developed method represents an improvement in transfection
391 performance compared to previous methods making determination of higher extents of inactivation
392 possible. Further improvement of this efficiency may be attainable by optimizing transfection parameters
393 such as cell type, cell age, transfection agent concentrations and ratios to viral RNA, and use of a different
394 transfection reagent. Furthermore, this method gives a more accurate picture of genome functionality loss
395 as compared to previous PCR-based studies, which merely represents the failure of PCR enzymes to read
396 and amplify the damaged genome. Although the results from qPCR can give us some indication of the
397 extent of damage occurring on the genome, the difference between transfection and qPCR results are
398 notably different. This is demonstrated especially for the case of FC disinfection, where reductions by
399 transfection indicate a significantly lower level of genome damage than are predicted by qPCR. This
400 emphasizes that the two methods are fundamentally measuring different things: genome integrity
401 according to the PCR enzyme's ability to amplify damaged sequences and true genome functionality in
402 terms of the ability of host cellular machinery to produce an infectious virus. This does not negate the
403 usefulness of PCR-based methods, which will continue to be of great value to numerous aspects of
404 environmental virology (physical removal, environmental detection, etc.). In terms of reflecting true viral
405 genome functionality, however, transfection appears to be a more accurate method.

406

407 **4. Materials and Methods**

408 *4.1. Virus and Cell Culture*

409 Buffalo Green Monkey Kidney (BGMK) cells were obtained from the Spiez Laboratory
410 (Switzerland) and were utilized for the purpose of virus propagation, infectious titer assays and
411 transfection assays in this study. These cells were maintained and grown with minimum essential media
412 (MEM) containing Earle's salts and L-glutamine (Gibco) supplemented with Penicillin/Streptomycin
413 (Gibco) and either 10% or 2% fetal bovine serum (FBS, Gibco) for cell preparation or virus
414 infection/transfection, respectively. Cells were incubated at 37°C in a 5% CO₂ atmosphere for all assays.
415 Echovirus 11 Gregory strain (ATCC VR-41, LGC Standards (Molsheim, France)) was cultured by
416 inoculating virus onto confluent monolayers of BGMK cells at a multiplicity of infection of 0.1 infectious
417 viruses/cell, and were incubated until CPE was observed (2-3 days). Cells were then freeze-thawed once
418 and centrifuged to remove cell debris. The supernatant was concentrated using an Amicon centrifugal
419 filter (MWCO 100 kDa). Three rinses were performed with phosphate buffered saline (PBS; 5 mM
420 Na₂HPO₄ (99%, Acros), 10 mM NaCl (99.5%, Acros), pH 7.5) at 10x the volume of the retentate. The
421 infectious titer of the virus stock was determined by cell culture using a MPN method. Briefly, serially
422 diluted samples of the virus were inoculated onto confluent BGMK cells in 96 well plates (CELLSTAR,
423 HUBERLAB) with 5 replicates per dilution and were incubated for 5 – 10 days to observe cells for CPE.
424 Infectious virus concentrations were calculated using the MPN method based on the number of wells
425 exhibiting CPE for a given dilution and are reported as MPN IV/mL. This propagation process typically
426 yielded a final concentration of 1×10^8 IV/mL.

427 *4.2. Inactivation Experiments*

428 E11 inactivation experiments were performed with four disinfection treatments: ozonation,
429 chlorination, UV₂₅₄ and heat. Each disinfection process is described briefly in the following.

430 Ozone inactivation of E11 was performed as described previously (38). Briefly, an ozone stock
431 solution was prepared by continuously bubbling an ozone-containing oxygen gas through Milli-Q water
432 kept at ~4°C; ozone concentrations were measured by UV-Vis absorption at 260 nm with a molar
433 absorption coefficient of 3200 M⁻¹ cm⁻¹ (39). Ozone stock was applied to an experimental solution of PBS

434 (pH 6.5) containing ~0.25 mM trans-cinnamic acid (Sigma-Aldrich) to control the ozone exposure (38),
435 ~0.02 M tert-butanol (Sigma-Aldrich) to scavenge hydroxyl radicals, and an E11 concentration of $\sim 1 \times$
436 10^5 to 1×10^6 IV/mL (38). Ozone doses ranged from 2.7-9.8 mg O₃/L (corresponding to $(5.6 \times 10^{-5} - 2.05$
437 $\times 10^{-4})$ M), yielding estimated ozone exposures ranging from (0.02 – 0.27) mg*s/L (38). After ozone
438 addition, the experimental solutions were stirred and allowed to react for 3 min until complete ozone
439 depletion. All samples were sacrificial, with one exposure condition (ozone dose and exposure) per
440 sample.

441 FC inactivation experiments were performed as described previously (40). All FC experiments were
442 performed in chlorine demand-free glassware prepared by soaking glassware in a 200 mg/l hypochlorite
443 solution for at least 1 hour or overnight, after which all glassware was rinsed three times with Milli-q
444 water before being air dried in a recirculating hood. An FC stock solution was prepared freshly for each
445 experiment; this FC stock was applied to an experimental solution of PBS (pH 7.5) to achieve a FC dose
446 of either 2, 2.5 or 3 mg/L as HOCl (corresponding to $(3.8 - 5.7) \times 10^{-5}$ M). Concentrations of FC in both
447 the stock FC solution and final experimental solution were verified by reaction with *N,N*-diethyl-*p*-
448 phenylenediamine oxalate (DPD, Acros Organics) in phosphate buffer and measured at 515 nm (41).
449 Virus was added to the experimental solution for a final E11 concentration of $\sim 1 \times 10^7$ to 1×10^8 IV/mL
450 and stirred for various exposure times (10 to 60 sec). FC reactions were quenched by addition of an
451 approximately 7-fold excess concentration of sodium thiosulfate (Sigma-Aldrich). Samples were stirred
452 for an additional 1-2 minutes to ensure complete quenching of FC. All samples were sacrificial, with one
453 exposure condition (FC dose and exposure time before quenching) per sample.

454 UV₂₅₄ inactivation experiments were carried out described previously (40) with minor exceptions.
455 Briefly, UV₂₅₄ was supplied using a bench-scale enclosure with a low-pressure monochromatic (254 nm)
456 UVC lamp (Philips, TUV F17T8) equipped with a manual shutter. A fluence rate of 1.46 W/m² was
457 measured by actinometry as described previously (42). Experimental beakers were prepared by wrapping
458 them in aluminum foil and were filled with 12 mL PBS (pH 7.5) with E11 inoculated to a final

459 concentration of $\sim 1 \times 10^6$ to 1×10^8 IV/mL. An initial sample (2 mL) was taken from each replicate
460 beaker before UV₂₅₄ exposure. After this, E11 was exposed to UV₂₅₄ during 24 sec intervals up to a
461 maximum of 120 sec (fluence values ranging from 35 – 175.2 J/m²) while stirring. 2 mL samples were
462 taken from each experimental beaker after sequential UV₂₅₄ exposures (i.e., after 24 seconds, 48 seconds,
463 etc.).

464 Heat inactivation experiments were performed in a similar manner to Meister et al. (40) by
465 preheating 2 mL volumes of PBS (pH 7.5) in microcentrifuge tubes to 55°C in a heating block. In
466 previous kinetics studies in our laboratory, we established that this temperature leads to significant, yet
467 measurable inactivation of E11 within a minute (40). Temperatures were measured in a separate control
468 sample before virus addition. After the target temperature was reached, E11 was added to the preheated
469 PBS, inverted twice to mix, and kept in the heating block for various time intervals (5 to 50 sec). After
470 exposure times, the experimental tubes were submerged in a dry ice/ethanol bath ($\sim -70^\circ\text{C}$) for 20 sec to
471 rapidly cool the samples to room temperature; this method was verified in separate experiments to cool
472 samples from 55°C to approximately 20°C in 20 sec.

473 *4.3. Post-Inactivation Sample Handling*

474 For all inactivation experiments, samples (0.01 or 0.1 mL) were taken after treatment for determining E11
475 infectivity by cell culture as describe above. The remaining sample (45 mL for ozone and FC, 1.9 mL for
476 UV₂₅₄ and heat) was concentrated further using Amicon Ultra centrifugal filters (15 mL and 0.5 mL).
477 Samples were sequentially applied (15 mL or 0.5 mL at a time) to the same centrifugal filter until the
478 entire sample had been concentrated. Sample concentration factors ranged as follows: ozone samples, 65
479 – 197×; FC samples, 311 – 416×; UV₂₅₄ samples, 27 – 63×; heat samples, 29 – 54×. The concentrated
480 samples were then used for determining E11 genome functionality by transfection.

481 *RNA extraction*

482 RNA extraction was performed with the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini kit following manufacturer procedures
483 (Qiagen). To maximize the recovery of total viral RNA, a two-step elution process was used, whereby
484 viral RNA bound to the silica column was eluted by two sequential elutions of 40 μ L each. These two
485 elution volumes were combined and either used within 1 day of extraction (kept at 4°C) or frozen (-20°C)
486 for subsequent RT-qPCR and MPN transfection assays. Storage of viral RNA for either short-term
487 periods (1-2 days) at 4°C and longer periods (1-2 weeks) at -20°C were not found to significantly
488 decrease transfection performance or relative qPCR reductions (data not shown).

489 *4.4. MPN Transfection Assay Development*

490 Viral inactivation studies utilizing transfection of viral RNA (21, 22) employed two transfection reagents
491 diethylaminoethyl (DEAE)-dextran (21) and Lipofectamine 2000 (22) to insert viral RNA into
492 mammalian cell lines, after which virus production was quantified by means of a plaque assay method
493 (21) or was simply confirmed by quantitative PCR (22). For the current study, we developed a MPN
494 format method to quantitatively determine the concentration of functional infectious viral RNA within a
495 sample. We utilized the Lipofectamine MessengerMax transfection reagent (Thermo Scientific), which is
496 optimized for transfection of mRNA into cells. Because mRNA is structurally and functionally similar to
497 the (+) sense viral RNA contained within E11, it can be assumed that this reagent should be able to
498 efficiently transfect viral RNA into host BGMK cells.

499 *Method Description*

500 In preparation for the transfection assay, BGMK cells were seeded into 96 well plates at a cell
501 count of approximately 8×10^4 cells per well. This number of cells resulted in monolayers which were 80
502 – 100% confluent within 1 – 2 days, which is recommended by the manufacturers for successful
503 transfection. Just prior to transfection, old media was removed from the 96 well plate and fresh MEM
504 media supplemented with 2% FBS was added (0.1 mL per well). A 5-well MPN method was devised,
505 whereby serially diluted (1:10) viral RNA was transfected into 5 replicate wells of BGMK cells per

506 dilution. For example, a sample where 4 dilutions of RNA were evaluated would result in 20 (4 dilutions
507 × 5 MPN replicate wells) separate transfection reactions. To ensure that the timing of transfection
508 reactions was performed exactly the same for each replicate reaction, 8-tube strips were utilized along
509 with multi-channel pipettors. Viral RNA was diluted from the original sample into Opti-MEM reduced
510 serum media (Gibco) in 8-tube strips for the desired number of RNA dilutions. In a separate 8-tube strip,
511 Lipofectamine MessengerMax reagent was placed into the same number of tubes as the number of RNA
512 dilutions. The volume of Lipofectamine was calculated to be equivalent to 0.3 µL per transfected well. In
513 the case of this study, five replicate MPN wells were transfected from the same Lipofectamine/RNA
514 reaction, thus 1.5 µL of Lipofectamine was added for each reaction tube. Opti-MEM was then added to
515 the tubes containing Lipofectamine reagent and the tubes were allowed to sit at room temperature for 5
516 minutes before combining the diluted Lipofectamine with the messenger RNA at a 1:1 ratio. The
517 Lipofectamine/RNA mixture was allowed to complex for 10 min at room temperature per manufacturer
518 instructions before applying the mixture to five replicate wells of the previously prepared BGMK cells.
519 Samples were then incubated at 37°C in a 5% CO₂ atmosphere for 4 to 8 days until CPE was observed (4
520 days was usually sufficient to observe complete CPE). The most probable number of TGU/mL of sample
521 was determined based on the number of wells in each dilution exhibiting CPE.

522 *Transfection Verification and Method Validation*

523 To verify that CPE observed in positive wells was actually due to the production of infectious virus, a cell
524 culture confirmation infection was performed. Transfected 96 well plates from across several transfection
525 experiments were selected and freeze-thawed once to release cell-enclosed viruses. An aliquot of 0.1 mL
526 sample of supernatant was collected from all wells for a given MPN sample via multi-pipettor using one
527 tip per well to avoid cross contamination. These samples were placed directly onto a fresh 96-well plate
528 of healthy BGMK cells along with 0.1 mL of 2% FBS supplemented MEM media. These confirmation
529 plates were incubated for 5 – 10 days to observe cells for CPE. The MPN pattern was then compared to
530 that of the original sample plate to confirm in which wells CPE was actually produced by an infectious

531 virus. A sensitivity and specificity analysis (described below) was performed comparing transfected wells
532 with positive/negative CPE to the same sample wells after cell culture confirmation to confirm true and
533 false positives/negatives for CPE.

534 In addition, reverse transcriptase (RT-)qPCR was used to verify that CPE in fact resulted from the
535 successful infection of the cells by E11. Several CPE positive transfected wells were sampled at random,
536 freeze/thawed once to release virus progeny and viral RNA was extracted as previously described (See
537 section 4.3). RT-qPCR verification was performed with a previously established qPCR primer set (19)
538 consisting of forward primer 3F (5'-ACTTTGGGTGTCCGTGTTTC-3') and reverse primer 4R (5'-
539 TACTCAGGCCATCGACCATAC-3'). RT-qPCR was performed on a MIC qPCR machine (Bio
540 Molecular Systems) utilizing the One Step TB Green™ PrimeScript™ RT-PCR Kit (Perfect Real Time)
541 (TaKaRa, Clontech) with previously established cycling conditions (5). The infection by E11 was
542 considered successful if the E11 genome copy number in a well was greater than the originally transfected
543 E11 RNA concentration.

544 To verify the proportionality between infectious virus (IV/mL) and transfectable genome units
545 (TGU/mL), an untreated sample with a known concentration of E11 was serially diluted (1:5) in PBS and
546 each dilution was quantified for infectious virus by cell culture and for functional genome by the
547 developed transfection assay. This also had the secondary purpose of identifying the minimum amount of
548 RNA necessary for successful transfection in order to more clearly define the virus concentrations
549 necessary for inactivation experiments to produce measurable TGUs. To determine the repeatability and
550 of the MPN transfection assay, as well as the average TGU/IV ratio, three of the extracted viral RNA
551 samples from the validation experiment (with three different concentrations of infectious E11) were
552 selected and MPN TGUs were measured 5 times for each sample using the developed transfection assay.

553 *4.5. Data Analysis*

554 MPN analysis was performed in R software (43) using an R script internally developed within our lab
555 (40) making use of the bbmle package (44) . Analysis of qPCR data was performed using the micPCR
556 software (v2.6.4) for determining Cq values. For linear regressions, slope values are reported as the slope
557 \pm the 95% confidence intervals. All calculations and linear regressions were performed using Microsoft
558 Excel 2016 software with the aid of the Data Analysis Add-on.

559

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563

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669 **Figure captions**

670 **Figure 1:** Transfection of RNA extracted from different concentrations of infectious virus (IV) for (a) all
671 samples and (b) for the three samples used to test repeatability. (a) The dashed line represents a 1:1
672 relationship, while the dotted line represents the linear regression calculated between infectious virus per
673 mL and TGU per mL. The distance between the two lines indicates the efficiency of the transfection assay.
674 The slope of the dotted line indicates the proportionality between infectious viruses and transfectable
675 genome units. The “×” symbol represents a sample that was quantifiable for infectious virus but not
676 quantifiable by the transfection method. For graph b), the x-axis represents categorical values of \log_{10} IV
677 per mL; separation of points in the x-direction for a given \log_{10} IV value is for the purpose of displaying
678 overlapping points only. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals for TGU values determined by the
679 MPN method.

680 **Figure 2:** Comparison of \log_{10} reductions of infectious E11 (IV) and \log_{10} reductions of genome
681 functionality measured in transfectable genome units (TGU) after inactivation by (a) ozone, (b) free
682 chlorine, (c) UV radiation, and (d) heat. Dashed lines represents a 1:1 relationship. Dotted line represents
683 the linear regression calculated between infectious virus reductions and TGU reductions. For graph (b),
684 FC concentrations are shown separately for 2 mg/L (open circles), 2.5 mg/L light circles) and 3 mg/L
685 (dark circles); the regression line was calculated for all FC concentrations together.

686

687 **Tables**

688

689 **Table 1:** Confirmation of CPE from transfected samples on fresh BGMK cells. Left table: a total of 1'684
 690 wells with transfected samples ("Transfection CPE") were re-inoculated onto BGMK cells ("Cell culture
 691 CPE"). Of the 838 wells exhibiting CPE after transfection, 713 also exhibited CPE in cell culture (true
 692 positive), whereas 125 wells were CPE negative in cell culture (false positive). Of the 846 wells
 693 exhibiting no CPE after transfection, 826 were also negative in cell culture (true negative), whereas 20
 694 were positive in cell culture (false negative). Right table: Same analysis, but excluding wells that were
 695 CPE positive due to the presence of high amounts of carrier RNA.

Including cRNA Affected Wells

		Cell Culture CPE	
		Positive	Negative
Transfection CPE	Positive	733 True Pos. 713	951 False Pos. 125
	Negative	20 False Neg. 20	826 True Neg. 826

Sensitivity 97% Specificity 87%

Not Including cRNA Affected Wells

		Cell Culture CPE	
		Positive	Negative
Transfection CPE	Positive	467 True Pos. 447	801 False Pos. 19
	Negative	20 False Neg. 20	782 True Neg. 782

Sensitivity 96% Specificity 98%

696





Figure 1




Figure 2